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        ABSTRACT  
 
  Niger is one of the world’s poorest countries, having a GNP per capita of close to $200 in 
2003. A landlocked country located in the Sahara and characterized by subsistence agriculture 
and low levels of industrial development, Niger has suffered major fluctuations in revenue since 
the 1970s. The revenue/GDP ratio has fallen from 14 percent in 1980 to 10.6 percent in 2002. 
Using data collected during several operational missions, this study finds that the principal 
reasons for low revenue mobilization are: the adverse fiscal impact of trade liberalization, the 
defiscalization of agriculture in the 1970s, the collapse of the uranium boom in the 1980s, and the 
poor record of the VAT in mobilizing revenue. The large reduction in tariffs during the 1980s and 
1990s in the context of structural adjustment programs and West African regional integration 
initiatives had  adverse effects on trade tax revenue during the period 1980-2003. However, 
higher import levels after 1994 succeeded in partially mitigating the revenue losses. The 
experience of Niger demonstrates that without accompanying macroeconomic policies, parallel 
improvements in tax and customs administration, and success in mobilizing domestic taxes, most 
notably the VAT, trade reform can have adverse fiscal consequences. Using a SMART model 
partial equilibrium analysis developed by UNCTAD for negotiators at multilateral trade rounds, 
three different tariff shocks were simulated to test the fiscal and trade implications of additional 
trade liberalization in Niger. First, the preferred tariff regime in terms of overall fiscal and trade 
creation impact was the harmonized Swiss formula in contrast to a ten 10 and 15 percent uniform 
tariff. Second, a possible Regional Economic Partnership Agreement (REPA) between the EU 
and UEMOA by 2015 that would abolish duties on EU imports to the UEMOA countries would 
have negative fiscal effects on Niger of more than 1 percent of GDP, positive effects on trade 
creation of about 1.5 percent of GDP, and ambiguous effects on local industry. While there will 
be some welfare gains for consumers and importers from lower import tariffs and the possibility 
of trade creation, the fiscal losses and adjustment costs would be significant, particularly in the 
machinery and transport sectors. Third, there are asymmetric gains and losses from regional 
integration and tariff changes, and a 10 percent uniform tariff would have the greatest impact on 
Benin and Senegal and some impact on Niger and Togo. In sum, further trade liberalization in 
Niger will have significant fiscal costs, partially offset by trade creation through increased 
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I. INTRODUCTION: THEORY AND EVIDENCE  
 
In the last several decades, there have been ambitious efforts in much of the developing 
world to liberalize trade and streamline protectionist tariff regimes. Spurred on by multilateral  
donors, many countries have been engaging in widespread and complex trade policy reforms. 
Recognizing that trade reform is vital for economic development and poverty reduction, 
developing country policymakers have lowered tariffs, reduced nontariff barriers, and eliminated 
many distortions in their economies.  
 
  Standard trade theory suggests that trade liberalization leads to a more efficient 
allocation of resources, enhanced productivity, and higher economic growth. Edwards (1993) 
finds that there is a strong empirical correlation between an open trade policy and economic 
growth since trade liberalization has a positive effect on export growth. However, in recent years, 
there has been some criticism of this prevailing orthodoxy. Rodrik (2001) has argued that the 
benefits of trade reform have been oversold and that economic policy should focus on growth and 
not on trade. He argues that an excessive emphasis on trade liberalization can backfire if it diverts 
scarce energies and political resources of government leaders from the growth fundamentals. 
While reforms in the area of commercial policy are an effective instrument for raising trade 
volumes in Sub-Saharan Africa, the effect on economic growth has been somewhat limited.   
 
However, since many low-income developing countries are often heavily dependent on 
trade taxes, trade liberalization has clear fiscal consequences. Depending specifically on each 
country’s particular economic structure, trade regime, political economy, and the relative mix of 
protective and revenue motives in trade interventions, trade liberalization can have an important 
impact on government revenue. While many economists find trade taxes a suboptimal method of 
taxation on efficiency grounds, the alternatives warrant consideration. The relationship between 
trade liberalization and tax revenue has been debated in the economic literature, especially in the 
last decade. In an influential study on the fiscal implications of trade policy reform, Greenaway 
and Milner (1993) find that there is a wide range of possible revenue outcomes from trade 
liberalization, depending on initial conditions, the components of the reform package, the effects 
of changes in tariff rates, changes in the import base, and changes in the exchange rate.   
 
In a seminal paper for the International Monetary Fund, Ebrill, Stotsky, and Gropp (1999) 
find that the revenue implications of trade liberalization depend significantly on the form of 
liberalization and the circumstances under which it occurs. More specifically, trade liberalization 
will have the fewest consequences on revenue mobilization provided that: the initial position is 
highly restrictive; trade liberalization involves the tariffication of quantitative restrictions; trade 
liberalization includes such reforms as reduction in tariff dispersion, introduction of minimum 
tariff, or the elimination of exemptions; trade liberalization is accompanied by reforms in customs 
and tax administrations, which reduce the incentive to evade taxes; and trade liberalization is 
supported by sound macroeconomic policies that ensure liberalization is consistent with external 
balance. In order to mitigate the adverse fiscal effects of trade liberalization, Tanzi and Zee 
(2001) suggest a three-part process for developing countries: first reducing the scope of tariff 
exemptions in the existing system, then compensating for the tariff reductions on excisable 
imports by a commensurate increase in their excise rates, and finally adjusting the rate of the 
general consumption tax (such as the VAT) to meet remaining revenue needs.  
 
In a review of recent African country experience of the fiscal impact of trade 
liberalization commissioned for the OECD Development Center, Fukasaku (2003) finds that the 
overall impact of trade liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa is ambiguous and depends on a   5
multiplicity of facts, especially the nature and sequencing of reforms. Examining a database of   
22 African countries, he finds that trade liberalization in the last decade has contributed to 
declines in the ratio of trade tax revenue/total government revenue of more than 20 percent 
(Mauritius), more than 10 percent (Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal), and more than 5 percent 
(Cameroon, Tunisia, and Mozambique). In several countries, notably Mauritius and Senegal, 
domestic indirect taxation and the VAT compensated for the fiscal losses, while in most other 
countries, domestic resource mobilization was somewhat weaker. The author concludes by 
stressing that reductions in tariff rates in Africa should be compensated by increases in domestic 
commodity taxes, an effective VAT, and the institutionalization of trade-policy-cum-tax reform, 
particularly in countries with a regional trade agreement.  
 
The objective of this paper is to analyze the revenue trends in Niger from 1980 to 2003, 
assess and quantify the fiscal implications of trade liberalization in the context of the country’s 
structural adjustment program and West African regional integration initiatives, and prepare 
partial equilibrium simulations of tariff shocks on Niger’s revenue and trade. Using data obtained 
in the course of adjustment credit and public expenditure missions, this case study is an attempt to 
understand the reasons for low revenue mobilization in Niger and to assess the relationship 
between trade liberalization and government revenue performance, particularly in relation to 
international trade taxes.  
 
        
II. COUNTRY CONTEXT  
 
Niger is one of the poorest and landlocked Sahelian Francophone countries in Western 
Africa, having a GNP per capita of only $200 and a very undiversified economic structure. Its 
small economy relies mostly on subsistence agriculture, animal husbandry, re-export trade, and  
uranium. Condemned by geography to a harsh environment, it is mostly situated in the Sahara 
Desert and was ranked 174 out of 175 countries in 2003, according to the UNDP Human 
Development Index.  Furthermore, two-thirds of the population live below the poverty line. 
Although it is a member of the seven-country monetary and economic grouping, the UEMOA 
(Union Monétaire et Economique de l’Afrique de l’Ovest), its landlocked location has made it 
particularly vulnerable to economic and political changes in neighboring countries.  
 
III. NIGER: REVENUE    
 
A. INTRODUCTION AND OVERALL TRENDS 
  
  One of the major obstacles to public expenditure in Niger has been low revenue 
mobilization by the central authorities.  A variety of factors, both domestic and external, can 
explain the poor capacity for revenue mobilization. Foremost is the weak economic structure of 
the country and the narrow resource base. Unlike many of its neighbors, Niger is not 
conspicuously blessed with natural resources, especially oil and timber. It has suffered from the 
devastating Sahel droughts of the 1970s and the growing expansion of the Sahara Desert, which 
has shrunk the country’s arable land. This landlocked country has attempted to construct a 
strategy of economic development on a fragile revenue base and uncertain donor assistance. 
Having a population the majority of which lives within 100 miles of the southern border, the 
country lacks both natural resources and physical infrastructure and is dominated by rain-fed 
agriculture, small herder livestock population, and mining. Furthermore, the economy has a large 
distinction between a small formal sector, encompassing the civil service, the state enterprises,   6
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and the mining sector, and a large growing informal one, including small-scale manufacturing, 
handicrafts, and village micro-enterprises. On the external front, the economy’s exports are 
highly concentrated among a few primary commodities (mostly, uranium, cattle, and onions) and 
hence the country is vulnerable to commodity price shocks. However, the start of gold operations 
in 2005 should partly diversify the export base.  
 
There are several key trends that emerge from a cursory examination of the data. First, 
Niger’s revenue/GDP ratio has declined significantly from 1980 to 1994 due to a combination of 
trade liberalization and the associated 
loss of tariff revenue, stagnant trade 
due to economic recession in the CFA 
zones, and indirectly, an overvalued 
exchange rate that hindered the 
region’s competitiveness. Only 
recently has revenue showed an 
upward movement. Over the whole 22 
year period, Niger’s revenue/GDP has 
fallen from 14% in 1980 to 10.6% in 
2002. Second, there have been 
fluctuations in the rate, suggesting a 
significant vulnerability to terms of 
trade shocks as well as changes in 
policy regime. Third, the revenue trend 
can be linked both analytically and 
empirically to the trend in trade tax 
revenue. Despite numerous attempts by the government to improve resource mobilization in the 
1980s and 1990s, through improvement in the direct tax system, adoption of the VAT, and 
customs reforms, it was the 1994 devaluation that provided a turning point for the country’s 
revenue performance.   
 
B. DETAILED REVENUE BACKGROUND  
  
1. COMPOSTION OF REVENUE 
 
The composition of Niger’s revenues has not varied considerably over time. First, 
international trade taxes from 1985 
to 2000 have continued to represent 
more than 40% of total government 
fiscal revenue but increased to more 
than 60% in 1990 before declining to   
50% in 2000. Second, taxes on 
goods have consistently provided 
one-fourth or more of government 
revenue except for a decline in 1990. 
Third, direct taxes have averaged 
close to 25% of revenue for much of 
the last two decades, but the share 
has recently declined to 15%. 
Finally, the ratio between the various 
sources of revenue has varied 
between the periods, but the main   7
CHART 3: REVENUE MOBILIZATION IN 




















finding is that other taxes have compensated for gaps left since Niger began to liberalize.   
 
2. COMPARISON WITH OTHER NATIONS 
 
 Niger’s tax ratio is very low by international standards. In 2000, Niger’s revenue of 10% 
of GDP was eight points below the 
developing country average. Both 
Mali and Burkina Faso, two regional 
comparators, had ratios close to 
15%.  Both countries had 
significantly higher income tax 
yields and a good performance in 
one of the other tax categories. Mali 
registered a success in mobilizing 
trade tax revenue, while Burkina 
Faso managed to collect more than 
6% of revenue from taxes on goods 
and services. Moreover, many 
developing countries in Africa were 
able to compensate for the decline in 
trade taxes with other taxes- VAT, 
excise, and income- while Niger has been unable to widen its fiscal base. Finally, in contrast to 
Niger, most developing country revenues have shown an appreciable increase over a 22 year 
period.  
            
3. AGRICULTURAL CONTEXT 
 
The agricultural sector provides a living for close to 90% of the population and together 
with the informal sector contributes close to 70% of GDP. Nevertheless, its contribution to fiscal 
revenue remains marginal, and it remains extremely vulnerable to external shocks. Niger suffered 
a “defiscalization” of agriculture in the 1970s and early 1980s for a variety of reasons. First, 
Sahelian droughts, prolonged periods of famine and low rainfall led to a commercialized 
agriculture being replaced by a system of subsistence agriculture, where cultivation was based not 
on maximizing production but on ensuring a minimal necessary to provide basic needs. Thus, 
Niger’s dependence on taxes on livestock owners and on revenue collected from cotton and 
peanut cultivation decreased. Furthermore, there was the removal of the two levies on agriculture, 
the head tax and the livestock tax. Third, Niger’s agro-pastoral exports to Nigeria, the principal 
destination, suffered from an appreciation of Nigeria’s naira. Fourth, the public agricultural 
enterprises in Niger- OPVN (cereals), SONARA (peanuts), and RINI (rice) – suffered from weak 
capacity and limited financial means to contribute to the state budget and to help commercialize 
agriculture. Finally, agricultural credit virtually disappeared in the 1980s with the elimination of 
the large credit agency, CNCA.   
 
 
4. INCOME TAX  
 
  The income tax regime in Niger, which currently accounts for 2% of GDP and about  
15% of government revenue, is characterized by several features. First, it has been mainly limited 
to the formal sector, with about 300 companies paying the majority of the taxes in 2000. In this 
context, the IMF is trying to reduce the special exemption arrangements (investment code, mining 
code, etc) that govern most of these individual enterprises through a more rigorous plan of   8
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auditing. Second, the current tax system largely bypasses the larger informal sector. While the 
1990s witnessed a growth of the urban and peri-urban informal sector,  due to poor institutional 
design of a revenue collection system and poor administrative capacity, the informal sector has 
been able to avoid the tax net of the state. In this regard, the creation of the SME Directorate in 
Niamey, which will supervise the approximately 1,000 small and medium enterprises situated in 
Niamey that are subject to taxation on the basis of annual income and are not covered by the 
DGE, is a promising development.  
   
5. URANIUM 
 
  Uranium has been Niger’s principal export and one of the key sources of revenue for 
much of the 1970s and the 1980s. Currently, ranking behind Australia and Canada, Niger 
produces close to a tenth of world output and exports close to 3,000 tons per year. In the heyday 
of the uranium boom in the 1970s before the commodity price slump of the 1980s, Niger enjoyed 
substantial export earnings and produced close to 4,000 tons per year. Its uranium sector had a 
dominant influence on the three categories of tax revenue: the income tax (profits, taxes, and 
wages) paid by the two big uranium companies – 
Cominak and Sonichar; international trade taxes 
(especially export tax); and other taxes 
(including uranium royalties). The contribution 
of uranium to government revenue, which 
contributed close to 40% in 1978-79, fell to 
10.6% in 1988-89. By 2000, the combined export 
revenues were less than 65 billion CFA francs. In 
the future, due to oversupply in the market and  
drawdown of commercial inventories held by 
nuclear utilities, the medium-term forecasts 
project low international prices, thus dampening 
prospects in Niger of another price boom.    
 
 
C. FISCAL IMPACT OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION   
 
One of the key factors responsible for revenue fluctuations in Niger has been fluctuations 
in trade taxes over the last two decades. Niger, like many other sub-Saharan countries, has 
undergone several rounds of significant trade 
liberalization since the early 1980s, first in 
the context of a structural adjustment 
program and then in the framework of West 
African regional integration, and has 
dismantled much of its protectionist trade 
regime. Prior to its reforms, Niger’s trade 
regime was characterized by high tariffs, 
multiple quantitative restrictions, import 
tariff exemptions, and administrative barriers 
to trade. After two decades, there has been a 
successful streamlining of tariffs and a 
reduction in both the ranges and the 
dispersions of tariff rates. Over the years, its 
average MFN tariff rate has decreased from 
more than 30 percent  in the 1970s and 1980s   9
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to less than 13 percent by 2003. (Chart 4) Furthermore, its quantitative import restrictions were 
abolished in 1990. However, in spite of its ambitious trade reforms, export and growth 
performance remained very weak due to a combination of poor resource endowment, geographic 
isolation, and a weak economic base. (Chart 5). Export/GDP growth declined significantly from 
1980 to 1990 and then stagnated for most of the last 15 years.  
 
As a signatory to the treaty establishing the West Africa regional grouping,  l'Union 
Économique et Monétaire Ouest-africaine (UEMOA), which was ratified by seven countries- 
Niger, Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Mali, Senegal, and Togo -and became effective in 
January, 2000, Niger has further reduced and harmonized its tariff to the regional common 
external tariff (CET), based upon a four-tier tariff classification of 0, 5, 15, and 20 percent. 
Furthermore, the treaty was built upon a previous monetary and exchange rate arrangement, in 
which the CFA had a fixed parity to the franc (later replaced by the euro). Within the union, 
Niger is one of the countries which has strong compliance with the CET and which has radically 
reduced its trade restrictiveness over the last decade. Currently, according to the IMF 
restrictiveness index, which combines average MFN tariff levels with trade restriction measures 
(import licensing, reference pricing, etc) to rank countries from 1 to 10 with 10 being the most 
restrictive, Niger has a value of 2 (IMF, 2003). The absence of restrictions on the making of 
payments of transfers for current international transactions, coupled with a streamlined trade 
regime, has given the country a relatively liberal exchange and trade system. 
 
 In Niger, contrary to the experience of several countries with SAF/ESAF programs, the 
ratio of international trade taxes to GDP declined from close to 5% of GDP in 1980 to slightly 
below 3% by 1994 and returned to 5% only by the end of the decade. The fluctuation in the trade 
taxes can be explained principally by movements in customs duties (consisting mainly of the 
droit fiscale and the droit de douane). Export duties during the last two decades have remained 
roughly constant at close to 1%, as has the VAT collected on imports.  
 
Trade liberalization and economic reform in Niger can be divided into several phases. 
During the first phase from 1982-1985 conducted under an adjustment program with the Fund, 
revenue from trade taxes deteriorated. The objective, which had been to improve the fiscal   10
revenue by increasing the rate of import and fiscal duties and the specific tax rates on alcohol, 
cigarettes, and tobacco along the Niger-Nigeria border, as well as a host of other measures 
designed to streamline the customs and taxation regime, was not achieved. The paradoxical effect 
of these reforms was to lower collected trade taxes and lead to a worsening fiscal balance. 
(Guillaumont et Guillaumont, 1991) There are several possible explanations for the poor revenue 
mobilization. First, trade liberalization created a change in the structure of imports by modifying 
the relationship between imports and rates. Also, agricultural imports in 1985 (brought in the 
country in response to the 1984 dry spell) were exempt from taxes. Second, clandestine 
commerce and fiscal evasion (arbitrary reclassification of products, bribery, false declarations) 
increased as a consequence of the rate increases. At the end of the period, in order to broaden its 
domestic tax base as part of its overall liberalization, Niger adopted the value-added tax, but the 
administrative costs and haphazard application ensured a low yield rate. (Annex 1) 
 
In the second phase of reform from 1986 to 1994, there was a marked decline in trade tax 
revenue as a share of GDP due to a combination of tariff reduction and stagnant trade. An 
improvement in the government’s fiscal position from 1988 to 1991 due to reduction in the 
average tariff rate 
1 was  followed  by a steep decline in revenue as a result of further import 
liberalization as well as the economic recession in the two zones. A sudden collapse in 
international commodity prices in the mid 1980s resulted in a significant terms of trade shock for 
the Nigerien economy. However, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the CFA economies in West 
and Central Africa, including Niger, maintained an overvalued exchange rate, which was 
undermining the competitiveness of the zone. Since flexibility in the exchange rate was not an 
available policy instrument due to the fixed exchange peg to the franc, the operational flexibility 
to adjust to shocks was reduced. Niger relied on an adjustment strategy involving contractionary 
fiscal and monetary policies to deflate domestic prices to achieve the required depreciation in the 
real effective exchange rate. However, the exchange rate remained overvalued and 
noncompetitive, and the adjustment policies failed to deflate relative prices.  In this context, it is 
also important to note that improvements in administrative capacity and customs administration 
were not important parts of the reform package. Difficulties in policing  long 3,500 mile frontiers 
along desert and savannah, particularly along the border with Nigeria, due to weak customs 
capacity, led to inadequate customs revenue.
2 The experience of Niger from the period 
demonstrates that without the right accompanying macroeconomic policies, coupled with customs 
reforms, trade liberalization may have limited effectiveness. 
 
In the third phase, from 1994 to the present, Niger’s reliance on trade taxes increased due 
to a marked increase in import tax receipts. The revenue implications of trade liberalization were 
offset by higher import levels resulting from the 1994 50% devaluation of the CFA franc, which 
had succeeded in boosting the economies of the zone and improving receipts from external and 
intra-regional trade. Partly due to the exchange rate effect, import duties and customs receipts 
                                                 
1 It is interesting to note that the lowering of tariffs on certain products like biscuits and soaps resulted in an 
increase in declarations on these products.  
2 Trade between Nigeria and Niger has been grossly asymmetrical, with Nigerien exports accounting for 
less than .1% of Nigeria’s total imports while trade with Nigeria accounts for 20% of Niger’s official 
exports and 14% of its official imports. While Niger imports principally light manufactured goods, 
hydrocarbon and other energy-related products, and equipment from Nigeria, its principal exports are 
onions, livestock and vegetables. Imports from Nigeria constitute 13% of total receipts on external trade 
while re-exports also bring in significant amounts of money. Official statistics in Niger have frequently 
understated imports and exports from Nigeria. The fiscal effect of this illegal trade is significant, with 
estimates suggesting that the loss of import duties and export taxes amounted to close to CFA 30 billion in 
2000. An increase in customs capacity could reduce this leakage.  
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picked up with the droit de douane increasing from 2.5 billion CFA in 1994 to 12.9 billion CFA 
in 1995. By 1998, this surge leveled off and there was a decline in revenue after 2000 as the 
UEMOA common external tariff was implemented.  
 
D. REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS AND REVENUE 
 
The adverse fiscal effects of trade liberalization were manifest as Niger’s customs and 
import duties from its UEMOA trading partners decreased as the zone became a unified economic 
space in January 2000. There was a further deterioration of revenues as goods coming from Cote 
d’Ivoire, Benin, Burkina, and Mali were no longer subject to tax or tariff at the border with Niger. 
Nigerien authorities have estimated that in 2000 the loss of customs revenue due to the 
introduction of the full CET in January 2000 amounted to CFAF 10.8 billion in 2000 (WTO, 
2003). In this regard, a compensation mechanism was established in order to assist  the poor 
landlocked countries for the loss of custom revenue incurred  as they liberalized their trade 
regimes and eliminated tariff barriers. The fund, called the rélèvement communautaire de 
solidarité (PCS) is based on a surcharge of 1 percent levied by member states on imports outside 
the union and supplemented by external financial support from the EU.  
 
 
BOX 1: UEMOA AND ECOWAS  
 
The government of Niger is a signatory to the UEMOA treaty, which was ratified in January, 1994 
by seven countries- Niger, Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Mali, Senegal, and Togo, creating a common 
economic and monetary union in West Africa, as well as an institutional framework providing for the 
coordination of economic policies between member countries. The union was formally created in January, 
2000. Complementary to the establishment of UEMOA in West Africa, there has been an increased 
momentum to integrate the West African CFA countries with several non-CFA countries under the larger 
framework of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), which include the Anglophone 
Nigeria and Ghana. However, while the texts have been prepared, cooperation between the UEMOA 
Commission and the ECOWAS Secretariat improved in relation to the harmonization of trade liberalization 
schemes, significant obstacles remain to the actual implementation of the agreements.  
 
 
However, the recent crisis in the Ivory Coast, which started in September 2002 has had a 
negative effect on the compensation fund. While Niger received more than CFA 20 billion from 
the compensation fund from 1998 to 2002, the crisis resulted in shortfalls in the transfers to 
Niger, with the regional organizations owing Niger a potential CFA 6 billion in 2003 and 2004. 
This has had an impact on overall revenue performance, contributing to a deterioration in revenue 
performance between 2002 and 2003, falling from 10.6 percent of GDP to 9.9 percent  Currently, 
the IMF team is working with the government to review prospects in relation to returning 
UEMOA transfers to levels prevailing before the crisis, which would bring in CFA 3-4 billion in 
additional revenue (0.2 percent of GDP) in 2004. (IMF, 2004) While compensation for revenue 
shortfall was set at 100 percent for 1996-2002, the rate declined to 80 percent in 2003, 60 percent 
in 2004 and is scheduled to decrease to 30 percent in 2005, with no reimbursement from 2006 
onward. Thus, the compensation will end automatically by 2006, during which time the country 
will have to find alternative revenue sources. Since the Ivory Coast is one of the principal 
contributors to the fund, political and economic developments there will continue to generate 
aftershocks for the rest of the zone. The experience of Niger suggests that revenue losses from 
regional integration have been significant since Niger did have trading links with its neighbors, 
thus confirming the concerns of the UEMOA architects.  
   12
CHART 7: NIGER - COLLECTED TARIFF 































































E. COLLECTED TARIFF RATE 
 
A second variable to analyze is the collected tariff rate, which presents a deeper estimate 
than the more conventional revenue-to-GDP indicators. This rate, defined as the ratio of the 
import duties collected to the value 
of overall imports, also allows one 
to get a more precise handle on the 
revenue effects of  trade 
liberalization. While most regions 
have witnessed a significant 
decline in the ratio of trade tax 
revenue to GDP, collected tariff 
rates have exhibited considerable 
variation with some countries 
having parallel movements and 
others having divergent trends. 
Careful work at the IMF 
corroborates the proposition that 
movements in the collected tariff 
rate correlate more positively with 
liberalization than trends in the ratio of trade taxes to GDP and that an econometric model with a 
data sample of 27 developing countries finds that for the period 1980-85, the average ratio of 
tariff revenue to GDP declined, while the average collected tariff rate increased, while the trends 
were reversed for the period 1985-1992, when trade liberalization was more pronounced. (Ebrill, 
Stotsky, and Gropp, 1999) Furthermore, empirical evidence from cross-sectional work suggests 
that there is frequently a nonlinear relationship between the statutory tariff rates and the rates 
actually collected. (Pritchett and Sethi, 1994) The higher the tariff rates, the greater the incentive 
for importers to find ways to seek exemptions. In Niger, the movements in the collected tariff 
rates roughly match the movements in the ratio of tariff revenue to GDP, with a slight post-1982 
decrease as Niger began its trade reform, followed by considerable fluctuation from 1985 to 1990, 
a pre-devaluation decline between 1990 to 1994, and a post-devaluation steady increase. In sum, 
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The empirical part of the paper uses a static, partial equilibrium SMART model, jointly 
developed by researchers at the UNCTAD and the World Bank and widely used by negotiators at 
both bilateral and multilateral negotiations, to examine the effect of tariff changes on trade 
creation, trade diversion, and revenues on the economies of each of the seven UEMOA countries. 
In a broader sense, the work attempts to test several theses on the fiscal effects of alternative tariff 
regimes and gauge the fiscal effects of trade liberalization. The paper will use a preferred partial 
equilibrium analysis, which does not take into account broader general features of the 
international economy, but which undertakes a quick analysis of wide range of commercial policy 
issues and which is calculated at the tariff chapter-level.  In this way, very useful insights can be 
obtained on complex trade policy changes. While there is the lack of detailed data linking imports 
and revenue collections within many UEMOA countries and the plethora of exemptions, 
quantitative restrictions, national standards, and discriminatory treatment of national and regional 
products, the methodological approach used allows an initial assessment of the impact of reforms.  
B. THE THEORETICAL MODEL 
 
The underlying analytics of the theory are clearly defined in Laird and Yeats (1986) and 
ECA (2001). The derivation begins with a basic trade model composed of simplified import 
demand and export supply functions and an equilibrating identity:  
A simplified import demand function for country j from country k of commodity i:  
 (1)  ) , ( , ik ij j ijk P P Y f M =
     
 
The export supply function of commodity i of country k can be simplified as: 
 (2)  ) ( ikj ijk P f X =  
 The equilibrium in the trade between the countries is the standard partial equilibrium 
equation: 
(3)  ikj ijk X M =
 
 In a free trade environment, the domestic price of the commodity i in country j from 
country k would change with the change in an ad valorem tariff as follows:   
(4)  ) 1 ( ikj ikj ijk t P P + =
 
In order to get the price equation, differentiating we obtain:   14
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Using this, one obtains:  





















Using this, one can arrive at the trade creation equation: 















where  ijk TC  is the sum of trade created in millions of dollars over i commodities 
affected by tariff change and 
m
i α is the elasticity of import demand for commodity i in the 
importing country from the relevant trading partner.  ijk M  is the current level of import demand 
of the given commdity i, while 
0
ijk t  and 
1
ijk t  represent tariff rates for commodity i at the initial and 
end periods respectively.  According to the UNCTAD model, trade creation depends on the 
current level of imports, the import demand elasticity, and the relative tariff change and occurs 
when there is a shift from higher cost producer to lower cost producer as a result of elimination of 
tariffs on imports from the partner. Conceptually, the trade creation effect is caused by the extra 
output produced by the UEMOA member countries generated due to an increase in imports from 
the EU.   
If γ approaches infinity, then equation 8 can be simplified as follows:  
















The elasticity of substitution is expressed as the percentage change in relative shares of 
imports from two different sources due to a 1 percent change in the relative prices of the same 
product from the two sources. Conceptually, the elasticity of substitution is a measurement of the 
ease with which various imports can be substituted for one another. Technically, it is measured as 
the slope of the import isoquant.   
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In this equation, k denotes imports from EU and K denotes imports from the rest of the 
world.  
Trade diversion occurs when an efficient producer from outside the free trade area is 
displaced by less efficient producers in the preferential area. Essentially, trade diversion depends 
on the current level of imports from EU and the ROW (M
EU  and M
ROW ) , the percentage change 
of tariffs (
0
EU t  and 
1
EU t ) facing EU imports with those from ROW remaining unchanged, and the 
elasticity of substitution  M σ   of the imports between the EU and ROW into the concerned 
country. In the SMART framework, the trade diverted to the EU in the EPA can be expressed as:  
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The strength of trade diversion depends on whether one assumes that goods are perfectly 
substitutable or whether goods are imperfectly substituted and whether calculations are made at 
official rates or on actual collected rates.   
 
REVENUE EFFECT  
WITS/ SMART has a very precise and elegant methodology for calculating revenue 
effects. The tariff revenue is the product of the tariff rate and the tariff base (value of imports). 
Thus, before the change in the ad valorem incidence of trade barriers, the revenue is given as:  
(12)  ijk ijk ijk
k i
M P t R ,
0
, 0 ∑ ∑ =
 
After the change in tariff rate, the new revenue collection will be given by: 
(13)  ijk ijk ijk
k i
M P t R ,
1
, 1 ∑ ∑ =  
 
The revenue loss as a result of the implementation of an EPA is difference between  1 R  
and   0 R  which is: 
(14)  ijk ijk ijk
k i
M P t RL ,
0
, ∆ = ∑ ∑  
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C. SCENARIOS 
 
Three different tariff shocks were run to test the fiscal implications of alternative tariff 
regimes in Niger. A simple partial equilibrium framework and method were set up along the lines 
delineated in the theoretical model. In two scenarios, a revised tariff rate or formula was 
introduced across the board for all Nigerien products. The shocks were modifications of the 
current trade regime in UEMOA: 0 percent for raw materials, 5 percent for intermediate goods, 
15 percent for consumer goods, and 20 percent for capital goods. The empirical simulations 
examined the trade creation, trade diversion and revenue gains and losses under these differing 
scenarios. In the third scenario, the fiscal consequences of a uniform tariff were assessed for 
UEMOA countries, where trade taxes provide important sources of revenue.   
 
                              
                               BOX 1: LOW UNIFORM TARIFFS 
In recent years, the issue of uniform tariff has become an important one for both 
academic economists and development practitioners who feel that low, uniform tariffs are one of 
the optimal solutions to promoting greater competitiveness, especially in small, open economies.  
In the wake of Chile’s successful implementation of a 10 percent uniform tariff, there has been 
greater interest in streamlining cumbersome trade regimes in the developing world. Both the IMF 
and World Bank-sponsored work has been in the direction of tariff uniformity and against the 
wide range of tariff dispersion. Tariff dispersion has been perceived as a barrier to 
competitiveness and productivity for many countries, and a contributor to smuggling and fiscal 
evasion in the developing world. 
A variety of explanations, both theoretical and policy-related, have been advanced to 
emphasize the benefits of a low uniform tariff. Panagariya and Rodrik (1993) have argued that 
tariff  uniformity can increase efficiency by lowering the value of implicit rents captured by rent-
seekers. A tiered tariff regime can result in misclassification of goods by importers in order to 
avoid higher tariffs. The greater the dispersion between tariff rates, the greater the tendency for 
product misclassification.  In this context, administrative simplicity and transparency in revenue 
collection have been cited as important advantages of low uniform tariffs. (Subramanian,1994). 
Setting trade tariff rates at a uniform level limits the ability of public officials to extract bribes 
from importers and may deliver higher government revenues and welfare than alternative tariff 
regimes;  the empirical evidence finds that these considerations are relevant to policymaking, 
since a robust association between the standard deviation of trade tariffs - a measure of the 
diversification of tariff menus - and corruption emerges across countries. (Gatti, 2003)   
  However, the vital role of tariffs as revenue sources in developing countries suggests 
that alternative tariff regimes need to take into consideration the fiscal losses from tariff reform. 
Rajaram (1994) and Mitra (1992) find that in countries with World Bank reform programs, an 
greater emphasis on revenue issues needs to be considered. This is especially the case in Africa, 
where trade taxes account for a significantly larger share of revenue than in other regions of the 
world and where Bank and Fund adjustment operations require adherence to strict fiscal criteria. 
In sum, revenue considerations are vitally important in trade policy design in Africa.  
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CHART 8: FISCAL IMPLICATIONS OF 
ALTERNATIVE TARIFF REGIMES IN NIGER 
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CHART 9: REVENUE AND TRADE CREATION 










   Raw
material
   Intermed   
Consumer 
   Capital TOTAL
Revenue Trade Creation
D. RESULTS  
 
1. SIMULATION A  
In the first simulation, three different tariff shocks were run to test the fiscal implications 
of alternative tariff regimes in Niger. In each scenario, a revised tariff rate or formula was 
introduced across the board for all 
Nigerien products.  The results are as 
follows. Under a low uniform tariff of 
10 percent, Niger loses close to .5% of 
GDP in tariff revenue, but it gains 
close to 1% of GDP through trade 
creation, while under a 15 percent 
uniform tariff, the revenue losses are 
slightly over .2% of GDP, while the 
gains are close to .5%. Finally, under 
the Swiss formula, a special kind of 
harmonized method that greatly 
narrows gaps between high and low 
tariffs,
3 the revenue losses are slightly 
over .5% of GDP, while the gains are 
close to 1.1% of GDP.   
2. SIMULATION B  
 
This simulation estimates the effects of setting up a possible Regional Economic 
Partnership Agreement (REPA) between the EU and UEMOA by 2015 to replace the existing 
system of non-reciprocal trade 
preferences through a bilateral 
deal. 
4Under this scenario, the 
ACP countries (like Niger) 
will retain their current 
preferential access to 
European markets, but would 
have to progressively open 
their own markets to European 
imports on a preferential basis.  
While currently ACP countries 
like Niger have close to zero 
barriers in EU markets for 
manufactures and non-
sensitive agricultural products, 
EU still faces higher tariffs 
                                                 
3 Developed in the 1970s during the Tokyo Round, the Swiss formula uses a single formula to produce a narrow range 
of final tariff rates from a wide set of initial tariffs as well as a maximum final rate.  
4 The main goal of the European Union is to establish free trade areas with the various ACP regions to replace the 
Lomé agreements , which are running counter to the spirit of the WTO. A multi-staged approach is planned, with 
negotiations from 2000-2005 and implementation after that. The major advantage to the developing countries from an 
EPA with Europe will be secure market access to the European market and allow exports to continue to enjoy 
preferential access.    18
CHART 10: REVENUE AND TRADE CREATION IMPACT OF REPA 
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especially for manufactured products in ACP markets. Thus, a REPA would give one-way market 
access for EU exporters in ACP markets. While in theory, the REPA could help foster trade and 
investment in Africa and have a general deflationary effect, their potential negative fiscal 
consequences (due to the loss of import duties as European imports will start replacing imports 
from the rest of the world) and possible displacement of local industry, as well as potential 
creation of local unemployment,  have created some apprehension in ACP countries. The 
competition faced by producers in ACP markets from higher quality but lower priced European 
goods could be offset by the gains to local consumer welfare from cheaper and better-quality 
imports.  
 
The results of the analysis suggest that Niger will lose fiscal revenue close to 1 percent of 
GDP (more than CFA 15 billion) and potentially gain 1.5 percent of GDP through trade creation, 
as new cost-effective EU supplies replace other imports and intra-UEMOA trade. Importantly, the 
elimination of tariffs will 
have a welfare gain both 
for domestic consumers in 
Niger who purchase 
finished goods from 
Europe and for  producers 
who purchase imported 
intermediate goods for 
production. In this 
scenario, the fiscal losses 
to Niger from a REPA 
would be considerable, 
and given its poorly 
developed fiscal system, 
losses would need to be 
compensated by EU 
transfers and external 
assistance. However, besides the loss of revenue, the adjustment cost of reallocating resources 
from producers displaced by the new imports will be significant. Partial equilibrium analysis 
shows that the key sector  that will be affected by a REPA will be the machinery and 
transportation sector (accounting for the large bulk of exports from Europe to both West and 
Central Africa), which will suffer fiscal losses of over $10 million, but offset by estimated trade 
creation of more than $25 million. Nevertheless, there will be marginal impact with respect to 
food and animals, crude materials, and chemicals.  
 
However, the extent of trade creation is dependent on a series of assumptions built into 
the SMART model. The overall welfare gains for Niger will depend on the overall efficiency and 
production costs of the European Union; the more efficient the EU, the higher the trade creation 
will be and the less trade diversion. The SMART model assumes that trade creation will occur 
whenever inefficient local production is displaced by imports. Specifically, trade creation will 
depend on the degree of substitutability between EU imports and domestic production and on 
collected tariff rates rather than official tariffs. (McQueen, 1999) It is difficult to quantify the 
effects of new EU imports on local goods because in the absence of precise microlevel data, it is 
unclear if they will replace highly competitive imports from Asia, imports from other UEMOA 
countries, or local production. However, Niger currently imports close to one-third from the 
European Union and one-fourth from Asia and the Middle East.  In the machinery and transport 
sector, which constitutes the bulk of Niger's imports from the EU, the EU is the lowest cost 
supplier with Japan as the only competitor, and due to high costs of production and greater   19
CHART 11: FISCAL EFFECTS OF A UNIFORM 
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shipping costs, Japan has not been successful in affecting European market share. China and the 
US are not major competitors in this sector since the bulk of Chinese exports are cereals and 
electrical machinery, while the US exports cereals, tobacco products, and textiles. Thus, the 
possibilities of significant trade diversion in this sector are unlikely, although in other sectors, 
there may some small trade diversion, which can only be confirmed from industry analysis. 
Finally, as in any partial equilibrium exercise, the results need to be taken with some caution 
since it is difficult to measure the possible growth-enhancing dynamic effects of the REPA’s on 
the Nigerien economy as it is of understanding the precise magnitude of the adjustment costs of 
reallocating internal resources.  
  
 
3. SIMULATION C     
 
In the third simulation, a tariff shock was introduced into each of the seven UEMOA 
countries’ tariff regimes in order to gauge the differential impact of tariff change on each of the 
countries. A 10 percent uniform tariff had the most effect on Senegal and Benin, two of the 
largest economies in the zone, with trade creation of 1.2 percent of GDP compensating for 
revenue losses of close to 0.5 
percent of GDP in Senegal and 0.7 
percent in Benin.  A second result 
of the simulation was that Niger 
and Togo, two of the poorer 
economies of the zone, had the 
second highest trade creation 
impact relative to GDP. Third, 
countries like Burkina and Mali 
did not have major fiscal losses or 
revenue gains. Fourth, Cote 
d’Ivoire has a much lower revenue 
and trade creation impact than 
expected due to the fact that a 
large percentage of its intermediate 
goods imports are already taxed at 
close to 5 percent, and 
consequently, an increase in tariff on intermediate goods to 10 percent results in a revenue gain 
and an opposite effect on trade creation. As expected, the results have been influenced by certain 
structural features of the zone which is characterized by diverse economic sizes, structures, and 
policy climates. The results confirm certain predictions that the larger partners in a zone are more 
affected by tariff changes than smaller partners. This asymmetry is more pronounced in a zone 
where income disparities and economic sizes are greater. In this context, it is important to note 
that the impact also depends on the fiscal bases of each member country and the dependence on 
tariff revenue, and a host of economic variables, including the relative shares of agriculture and 
manufacturing sectors in the overall economy.    20
  
      V. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
 
 Niger, one of the world’s poorest countries, having a GDP per capita of close to $170, 
has suffered major fluctuations in revenue since the 1970s. The revenue/GDP ratio has fallen 
from 14 percent in 1980 to 10.6 percent in 2002. Using data collected during from several 
missions, one finds that the principal reasons for low revenue mobilization are: the adverse fiscal 
impact of trade liberalization, the defiscalization of agriculture in the 1970s, the collapse of the 
uranium boom in the 1980s, stagnant trade, and the poor record of the VAT in mobilizing 
revenue.   
 
The experience of Niger shows that the large reduction in tariffs during the 1980s and 
1990s in the context of structural adjustment programs and West African regional integration 
initiatives had adverse effects on trade tax revenue during the period 1980-2003. However, higher 
import levels after 1994 succeeded in partially mitigating the revenue losses. Second, trade 
liberalization in Niger has not resulted in significant export growth during the last two decades. 
Third, without accompanying macroeconomic policies and a realistic exchange rate, tariff  reform 
will not be adequate. The maintenance of an overvalued exchange rate from 1986 to 1994 and the 
weakness of the internal adjustment strategy during this time failed to offset some of the gains 
that resulted from tariff liberalization. Fourth, improvements in customs administration are 
important in order to mitigate the revenue impact of trade reform. Fifth, the implementation of the 
VAT in Niger has not been a panacea due to  administrative costs and implementation difficulties. 
Sixth, the experience of Niger suggests that there are asymmetric gains and losses in any regional 
integration arrangement, and that dependence on external compensation may result in slippages in 
revenue targets, as seen by the impact of the Ivory Coast crisis on compensation payments to 
Niger. In sum, there was not a proper sequencing of policies in Niger during the design of  the 
reform process.    
  
  Using a SMART model partial equilibrium analysis developed by UNCTAD researchers 
for researchers and negotiators at multilateral trade rounds, three different tariff shocks were 
simulated in order to test the fiscal and trade implications of additional trade liberalization in 
Niger. First, the preferred tariff regime in terms of overall fiscal and job creation impact was the 
harmonized Swiss formula. Second, a possible Regional Economic Partnership Agreement 
(REPA) between the EU and UEMOA by 2015 that would abolish duties on EU imports to the 
UEMOA countries would have negative fiscal effects on Niger of more than 1 percent of GDP, 
positive effects on trade creation of about 1.5 percent of GDP, and ambiguous effects on local 
industry.  While there will be some welfare gains for consumers and importers from lower import 
tariffs and the possibility of trade creation, the fiscal losses would be significant as would the 
adjustment cost of reallocating resources from producers displaced by the new imports.  Third, 
there are asymmetric gains and losses from regional integration and a 10 percent uniform tariff 
would have the greatest impact on Benin and Senegal and some impact on Niger and Togo. In 
sum, further trade liberalization in Niger will have significant fiscal costs, partially offset by trade 
creation through increased imports.       
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ANNEX 1: VAT IN NIGER 
 
In order to broaden its domestic tax base as part of its overall liberalization, in January, 
1986 the Government of Niger adopted the value-added tax. (VAT). The main idea was to levy 
this tax on most goods and services, as well as most business transactions in order to compensate 
for trade liberalization and customs reform. The authorities cited a number of reasons as a 
rationale for the adoption of the tax. First, the VAT was supposed to end the fiscal and tax 
inequalities inherent in the prevailing system characterized by tax cascades and cumulative taxes 
without deductions. A second objective was to improve industrial investment through the 
mechanism of deductions conferred by the VAT. A third goal was to encourage exports, and a 
final one was to pass taxes from the economic operators to the consumers.  
 
 Within a year, protests from the business community pressured the government to reduce 
the standard rate from 25% in 1986 to 17% in 1987. Contrary to the stated efforts, the VAT did 
not succeed in mobilizing adequate revenue and suffered a number of shortcomings. Firstly, after 
the implementation of the VAT in 1986, Niger witnessed a decline in revenue rather than an 
increase, resulting in a budgetary crisis. The yield levels were quite low and continued to decline 
to close to 2% of GDP for much of the 1990’s. Secondly, there is widespread evasion, with some 
estimates suggesting that less than one-third of companies are paying the VAT. Thirdly, it is 
incomplete and excludes a large part of the service sector and agriculture sector from its 
application. Recently, there has been some discussion of extending the VAT on all processed 
food and of eliminating VAT exemptions on water and electricity consumption. Since it is a 
overwhelmingly  formal sector tax, it creates incentives for resources to shift into the informal 
sector, and its haphazard application and high administrative costs in a country with weak 
institutional capacity makes it difficult to administer.  
 
Finally, the evidence suggests that the credit mechanism is restrictive and that there are 
delays in providing proper credits for VAT on inputs. In Niger, in theory, the enterprise collects 
taxes calculated on its gross sales and then transfers to the Treasury those collections minus a 
credit for the taxes charged on its own purchases, as confirmed by invoices.  (Barlow and Snyder, 
1994) However, in practice, the operation of such a system requires proper record-keeping and an 
administrative machinery to handle the transactions. In this context, it is important to note that the  
turnover taxes which were replaced by the VAT provided twice the amount of revenues in several 
years. In sum, Niger needs to rectify the limitations in the VAT design and administration. 
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CHART 2: CEAO (UEMOA AFTER 1 994): 
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ANNEX 2: ASYMMETRIC GAINS AND LOSSES FROM INTEGRATION  
 
One of the major explanations for the differential gains and losses from regional 
integration is the differential size of the member states. Analytical work and cross-regional 
empirical evidence suggests that there is an asymmetric distribution of gains and losses from a 
regional integration agreement where there is a pronounced imbalance between the stronger 
economies and the weaker ones. (World Bank, 2003) Generally, a RIA between two poor 
countries has a tendency to cause income divergence, but a RIA between two rich ones will result 
in income convergence. Larger and more developed countries in a RIA gain relative to poorer and 
smaller members because due to the trade surplus of the former with the latter, after the formation 
of the union, the manufactures of the richer country are sold to the poorer countries free of tariffs, 
resulting in a transfer of tariff revenues from the poorer to the more developed countries and a 
worsening in terms of trade for the poorer country. (Schiff, 2000). This is especially the case in 
South-South partnerships. Furthermore, agglomeration effects and the migration of industries 
within regions further exacerbate the divide. Chart 1 and Chart 2 show that Niger’s share of 
UEMOA manufacturing value-added decreased from 8 percent in 1972 to 4 percent in 2001, 
while Cote d’Ivoire’s share increased from 41 percent to 52 percent during the same time frame. 
(World Bank, 2001) A delocation of small-scale industry within the union, coupled with the large 
migration of workers from the landlocked to the coastal countries, has affected the share of 
manufactures within the union.   




NIGER: KEY ECONOMIC INDICATORS 1997-2003
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Macoreconomy
  Nominal GDP (bill. CFA) 1077 1225 1243 1281 1426 1513 1588
  Real GDP growth (%)  2.8 10.4 -0.6 0.1 7.1 3.0 5.3
  Inflation (end period) (%) 4.1 3.4 -1.9 4.7 3.2 0.6 -1.5
  Gross investment/GDP (%) 10.9 11.3 10.2 10.8 12.1 14.2 14.2




   Revenue (excluding grants)/GDP (%) 8.4 8.9 8.8 8.6 9.3 10.6 9.9
   Total expenditure/GDP (%) 16.0 17.0 18.2 16.2 17.2 18.4 17.4
   Primary budget balance/GDP (%) -6.0 -6.6 -8.2 -5.9 -6.1 -6.3 -6.4




   Export growth, fob (%)  2.8 24.2 -9.9 14.2 -0.7 -2.5 4.4
   Import growth, cif (%) 11.7 33.6 -16.5 11.6 3.4 6.4 6.6
   Current account balance/GDP (%) -10.4 -10 -7.6 -7.5 -6.6 -7.8 -7.8
Debt
   Debt-service ratio/exports (%) 24.4 23.8 23.2 24.7 27.5 30.4 23.6
   Debt-service ratio/ revenue (%) 47.5 47.7 43.7 51.1 50.0 43.7 39.2
   Exchange rate (CFA per US dollar)  584 590 615 710 733 695 580
Sources: Government of Niger, IMF, and Bank staff estimates  26
ANNEX 4 
 
Niger Revenue Base:  1980-2003 (CFA Billions)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Total GDP 534.1 600.7 661.9 687.5 640 647.4 645.2 650.6 695.9 674 677.2 672.7 659 647.4 787.1 834.6 909.7 953.5 1086.7 1242.6 1280.4 1426 1512.8 1586.4
Total Revenue 77.4 76.8 73.8 68.8 70.1 70 74 75.6 68.2 70.1 69.3 56 51.7 46.7 53.2 67.9 79 90.8 111.8 109.6 110.1 132.3 160.9 156.7
14.5 12.8 11.1 10.0 11.0 10.8 11.5 11.6 9.8 10.4 10.2 8.3 7.8 7.2 6.8 8.1 8.7 9.5 10.3 8.8 8.6 9.3 10.6 9.9
  Fiscal Revenue 65.4 65.3 65.9 62.6 61.1 59.6 62.1 57.9 54 55.2 53.5 46.5 40.9 42 47.4 62.1 68.5 78.1 97 100.6 102.7 125 143.8 152.1
     Trade Taxes 26.6 29.6 32.9 28.3 24.7 26.1 29.6 25 22.8 24.9 31.7 22.9 18 19.3 22.6 29.2 36.9 43.5 56.9 56.4 53 63.4 82.8 79.9
        Import 22.8 24.7 28.1 22.9 20 21.5 24.9 20.4 18.3 19.5 23.2 15.5 12.7 14.2 16.9 24.7 25.9 33 45.9 46.2 45.5 58.1 65.8 63.4
           Customs duties 3.1 3.3 4 1.6 1.1 1.1 1.5 1.3 1.7 1.9 2.6 2.1 2.1 1.3 2.5 12.9 16.2 19.1 19.4 14.5 14.5 20.2 19.7 20.3
           Fiscal duties 4.8 5.1 5.6 6.5 5.7 6.2 5.6 4.5 4.5 4.6 4.9 6.5 5.2 4.7 3.3 7 0 0 0 0 0 1.5 0 14
           VAT 12.3 13.5 15.3 11.7 9.6 10.3 10.3 8.3 7.2 7.7 10.6 8.3 7.7 5 10.7 9.9 12.6 14.9 15.2 17.5 20 20 18.4 19.3
           Others 6.4 7.7 8 8.5 8.3 8.5 12.2 10.9 9.4 10.7 5.1 -1.4 -2.3 3.2 0.4 -5.1 -2.9 -1 11.3 14.2 11.0 16.4 27.7 9.8
        Export 3.2 3.9 3.7 4.6 4 3.8 3.9 4.1 4 5 7.7 6.2 5.7 5.5 7 4 5.2 6 6.1 10 10.3 1.5 1.3 15.2
           Uranium 1 1.2 0.8 1 1 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 1 1.1 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
           Other exp taxes 2.2 2.7 2.9 3.6 3 2.9 3 3.2 3.2 4.2 6.7 5.1 5 4.9 6.5 3.2 5.2 6 6.1 10 10.3 1.5 0 1.3
     Taxes on Goods     18 15.7 14 12.1 12.4 9.8 8.4 6.5 6.8 9.2 12.1 11.6 15.6 16.7 22.4 20.5 30.4 32.7 33.1
     Income Taxes 15.4 16 15 17.8 17.2 13.9 13.6 13.3 12.9 12.9 18.1 16.2 15.5 18.9 19.3 18 22.6 23.1 28.3
     Other Taxes 1.1 0.3 2.1 1.1 0.1 0.8 3.9 1.3 0.7 0 1.6 3.1 3 2.7 2.7 3.8 3.5 4.5 2.5 11.2 8.6 5.2 10.8
  Nontax Revenue 11.8 9.5 7.9 6.2 8.9 10.4 11.9 17.7 14.2 14.9 15.8 9.5 10.8 4.7 5.8 5.8 10.5 12.7 14.8 9 7.4 7.3 17.1 4.6
Source: Data collected from Ministry of Finance, Directorate of Customs, Directorate of Statistics, Directorate of Taxation, the Treasury in Niamey  27






TABLE 1: NIGER’S IMPORTS: 1995-2002 (% OF TOTAL IMPORTS)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Primary products 49 50.8 61.1 59.6 59.3 59.6 64.8 60.9
   Agriculture 35.6 38.9 49.4 46.6 45.5 42.9 49.4 44.1
    Food products 35.4 38.9 49.4 46.6 45.5 42.7 49.3 44.1
          Rice 7.6 10.1 15.5 13.7 12 11.7 16.5 16.3
          Palm oil 7.3 7.6 8.6 8.7 11.1 7.5 6.9 7.9
          Beet or cane sugar, raw 10.1 9 9.3 8.6 7.3 6.7 5.3 3.6
          Cigarettes 1.9 2.9 4.4 4.9 5.6 4.8 5.6 4.8
          Wheat or flour 0.7 1.9 3.9 3.9 3.7 4.1 4.7 4.4
          Milk and dairy cream 5.8 5 5 4.3 3.8 4.1 4.5 3.8
   Mining   13 11.9 11.8 13.1 13.8 16.7 15.4 16.8
          Fuel 11.2 10.3 10 11.8 12.7 15.4 14.4 16
Manufactures 51 49.2 38.9 40.4 40.7 40.4 35.2 39.1
   Chemicals 18.7 17.2 15.4 15.7 13.4 16.2 12.1 12.4
   Automobile products 10 10.6 2.9 6.2 6.8 6.6 6.6 6
Source: WTO (2003), IMF and Bank databases
TABLE 2: NIGER'S EXPORTS: 1995-2002 (% OF TOTAL EXPORTS) 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Primary products 99 98.7 99 98.4 99.1 98.5 98.6 98.6
   Agriculture 17.9 33.5 26.6 30.1 37.3 47.4 40.4 37
        Live animals (sheep and goats) 2.2 6.5 7.2 6
7.8 13.6 15
12.8
        Live animals (bovine) 3.8 10.1 7 6.9 8.4 12.2 10.7 8.5
        Other vegetables 9.2 11.9 7.4 11.5 11.8 8.5 3.9 4.4
   Mining 81.1 65.2 72.4 68.3 61.8 51.1 58.3 61.6
        Uranium 81 65.1 72.3 68.2 61.3 50.5 57.7 61.1
Manufactures 0.9 0.5 1 1.6 0.9 1.5 1.4 1.4
Source: WTO (2003), IMF and Bank databases